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LIBERALISM, FAITH, AND 
THE VIRTUE OF ‘ANXIETY’
Derek Malone-France
I argue for a re-appropriation of the religious/philosophical concept of ‘anxi-
ety’ regarding human fi nitude and fallibility as an ‘epistemic virtue’ that 
should frame the relationship between personal (including religious) belief 
and political participation and procedures. I contend that moral justifi cations 
of liberal norms based on ‘respect for persons’ and ‘tolerance’ are insuﬃ  cient 
without relation to such a (complementary) epistemic basis. Furthermore, I 
argue that a careful examination of the internal logic of religious belief, per 
se, undermines traditional understandings of ‘faith’ (as being categorically 
opposed to ‘doubt’) and reveals support for liberal norms as an necessary 
implication thereof.
The liberal personality thrives not on a harmonious inner life,
but on both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ value plurality,
and a consequent unease or dissatisfaction.1
And beside this, giving all diligence, add to your faith virtue.2
In his essay “Charting Liberal Virtues,” quoted above, political theorist 
Stephen Macedo gestures toward a central feature of the psychology of 
classical liberalism: a permanent—and productive—sense of epistemic anx-
iety, especially in relation to value judgments and the knowledge claims 
that frame them. Indeed, as I will argue below, principled liberalism re-
quires acceptance of such a sense of anxiety as an inescapable aspect of 
authentic human experience. For the logic of liberalism depends upon an 
open-ended acknowledgement of the uncertainty of human understand-
ings, including one’s own. If one is utt erly certain, beyond any measure of 
doubt, about the rightness of one’s own perspective, morals, lifestyle, etc., 
then one has no reason to be either epistemically anxious or liberal.3
Of course, some measure of liberalism may be embraced simply as a 
modus vivendi. One may not have the necessary numerical, economic, or 
technological advantage to be able to enforce one’s will (piece meal or 
wholesale), in which case one may compromise with others in order to 
avoid having someone else’s will enforced on oneself. But such a pure-
ly pragmatic aﬃ  rmation represents a merely strategic, not a principled, 
liberalism. Genuine liberalism is not simply a political technique. It is a 
commitment to certain fundamental moral, anthropological, and, even, 
metaphysical assumptions—and their normative implications. Liberalism 
makes use of political techniques in order to manifest its commitments, 
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but it shouldn’t be confused with these techniques on account of that fact. 
The Federalist4 is not just a user’s manual; it is also an argument for a lib-
eral understanding of the human condition. The quintessentially liberal 
pledge to “defend to the death” the right of another to speak an opinion of 
which one disapproves5 would represent a violation of the very rationale 
for accepting liberal norms from the point-of-view of the merely prag-
matic democrat. And such a pledge is pure lunacy from the perspective 
of anyone claiming an inerrant understanding of the right or the good. 
To repeat, then, an authentic (and steadfast) aﬃ  rmation of classical lib-
eral values requires a certain epistemic stance, a stance that involves some 
measure of anxiety, the sort of anxiety that is bred of doubt.6
One aim of this essay is to show that the inverse of this logic also holds 
true. Insofar as one acknowledges, even implicitly, that one is fallible and, 
therefore, incapable of “utt er certainty,” then one must feel some anxiety 
about the epistemic status of one’s beliefs and judgments. And insofar as 
one feels such anxiety, one is normatively obligated to aﬃ  rm basic liberal 
democratic principles, especially as relating to individual autonomy, the 
right of dissent, and the normativity of non-coercive deliberative dis-
course. More specifi cally, I will argue that the sort of anxiety just described 
represents an epistemic virtue, a cognitively basic response to the reality of 
human fallibility that should be understood as not only absolutely central 
to the liberal ethos and foundational to liberal norms but also defi nitively 
required by authentic religious commitment.
I will begin with a brief discussion of the historical context from which I 
am drawing this understanding of ‘anxiety’ (and its connection to classical 
liberalism), highlighting the contact between philosophical and religious 
themes that has been associated with the history of this concept. Next, I 
will explain my characterization of such anxiety as an ‘epistemic virtue’ 
and why I believe that it is the most fundamental of all liberal virtues, 
more fundamental, even, than ‘tolerance’ (which, I will show, ultimately 
rests on anxiety). Then, I will describe the phenomenology of epistemic 
anxiety and its role in democratic politics, contrasting my understanding 
with that set forth in a recent study of the function of anxiety in Ameri-
can democratic discourse by the political scientist George Marcus.7 And, 
fi nally, I will discuss, in detail, the connection between epistemic anxiety 
and social and political tolerance, with particular att ention to the relation-
ship between anxiety and religious faith.
Modernity, Anxiety, and Liberalism
The notion of ‘anxiety’—angst, anxiété, etc.—played an important role 
in late-modern philosophy and theology, beginning with Kierkegaard’s 
psycho-philosophical explorations of human subjectivity and belief and 
culminating in prominent philosophical and theological anthropologies 
of the early- and mid-twentieth century. In both its philosophical and 
theological formulations the term ‘anxiety’ generally denoted a profound 
awareness of human fi nitude and the various existential predicaments 
associated with it. One such predicament arises from the epistemic im-
plications of fi nitude: On the one hand, we are rational beings, with the 
capacity to explore the nature of the world around us and to construct 
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interpretations of its structure and signifi cance. On the other hand, we 
are also fi nite beings, whose perspectives and, therefore, understandings 
are contingent and incomplete. Hence, our conceptions of ‘the truth,’ par-
ticularly with regard to human purpose and moral judgment, are not, and 
never can be, absolutely reliable.8
In the early-modern west, the systematic recognition of humanity’s fal-
libility-in-fi nitude emerged along with the rise of deism during the sev-
enteenth and (early) eighteenth centuries and found support in the cri-
tiques of ecclesiastical authority that took root in both philosophical and 
theological discourse during the Enlightenment.9 Yet, during this period, 
absolute faith in the authority of canonical religious texts (and clerical in-
terpretations of them) was not merely abandoned; it was, for most think-
ers, replaced with an equally absolute faith in the authority and power 
of ‘reason.’ Thus, it was not until the mid-nineteenth century—when the 
‘unity’ and ultimate verifi ability of the conclusions of reason began in-
creasingly to be called into question—that the problem of human fallibility 
truly emerged in an acute form.10
Kierkegaard may have been the fi rst fully to perceive both the philo-
sophical and religious dimensions of modern anxiety, and his writings on 
the subject spurred the development of important philosophical and theo-
logical perspectives that took human fi nitude as the starting point of their 
analyses. In philosophy, the various problems associated with human 
fi nitude became a central focus of perhaps the most culturally prominent 
school of philosophical thinking of the twentieth century, existentialism. 
In theology, the anxiety provoked by an awareness of the implications of 
human fi nitude found prominent and perspicuous formulations in the 
writings of thinkers like Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich.11
Although fallibilism has remained a signifi cant theme in both phi-
losophy and theology, however, the concept of anxiety has largely dis-
appeared from the current discourses of these fi elds. In epistemologi-
cal terms, any systematic appeal to anxiety regarding human fallibility 
has been supplanted by the formulation of ‘coherentist’ understandings 
of knowledge and cognition. In moral and political terms, the notion of 
‘tolerance’—representing the positively formulated, prescriptive fl ip-side 
of epistemic anxiety—has come to dominate much of the discussion. Of 
course, methodologically speaking, such a shift  from a negatively framed 
to more positively framed formulations of the issue was quite natural. Yet, 
in making this shift  away from theorizing the notion of anxiety itself, con-
temporary liberal philosophical and religious thinkers have given up a 
powerful methodological concept, one with the capacity to provide vital 
support to liberal norms.
There are challenges associated with att empting to use ‘anxiety’ in this 
way, to be sure, the foremost of which is to overcome the natural resistance 
to such a use of this term because of the common association of ‘anxiety’ 
with negative psychological states. This is a legitimate concern, especially 
given the fact that there are other terms, such as ‘humility,’ which, prima fa-
cie, may seem to bear the same relevant denotation but which do not carry 
the same negative connotations in common usage. I will defer responding 
to this concern fully at this point and refer the reader to the remainder 
of the essay. In particular, the relationship of anxiety to humility—and I 
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do believe that there is an important relationship here—will be taken up 
explicitly in the second and third sections below. However, I will at this 
point oﬀ er one very general historical rationale for att empting to resurrect 
the sort of explicitly epistemic use of anxiety that I am referencing here.
The anxiety about their own fallibility as human beings that gradually 
emerged among a signifi cant portion of the literate public in the west dur-
ing the modern period was one important element in the development, 
evolution, and survival of political liberalism. This idea is closely connect-
ed, but not reducible, to the commonplace historical claim that liberalism 
emerged out of the chastening eﬀ ect that the European ‘wars of religion’ 
had on evangelical and sectarian enthusiasms. Certainly, all sections of so-
ciety tired of the bloodshed that prefaced European modernity, but there 
was also an anxiety that sprang most directly from the erosion of the epis-
temic authority of religious institutions and the historical normativity of 
the biblical narrative. This is an anxiety that owed more to the persistence 
of the deists than to the excesses of the Cromwellians, and its power only 
increased as nineteenth-century thinkers like Darwin and Strauss further 
undermined the bedrock assumptions on which religious (and other) 
groups had predicated their competing claims to historical and normative 
orthodoxy. And, if such epistemic anxiety was an important psychological 
and social precondition for the development of pluralistic liberal norms, 
then it seems reasonable to assume that its maintenance is a necessary 
condition for the preservation of such norms.
Though western intellectuals have long comforted themselves with the 
myth of a so-called “secular age,” the empirical evidence has never sup-
ported it. The vast majority of Americans identify, as they always have, as 
religious, and the very great majority of religious Americans identify as 
Christian. That does not make the United States a “Christian nation,” but 
it does suggest that the potential tension between religious faith and po-
litical principles remains one of enduring concern in the US. Moreover, for 
those who are both religious and liberal (in the broad and classical sense), 
the continuing infl uence of dogmatic religious and moral claims in socio-
political discourse suggests that we face much the same struggle against 
absolutism today that our Enlightenment predecessors faced in their time. 
Hence, we would do well to promote the sorts of att itudes that helped to 
shape their response to this challenge (which was successful enough to 
reconstitute the very nature of political society in the west).
Of course, one may object that, insofar as basic liberal values are re-
lated to respect for the ‘dignity’ or ‘sacredness’ of the human individual, 
there may be other routes to authentic liberalism than that which runs 
through anxiety. Aft er all, historically speaking, ‘liberalism’ (even in its 
classical sense) is a multivalent term, encompassing various related, but 
diﬀ erentiable, conceptions. But the question is whether each of the various 
forms of ‘liberalism’ that emerged out of the Enlightenment are equally 
authentic, equally steadfast in their commitments to those principles that 
distinguish liberalism from more authoritarian modes of moral-political 
consciousness and practice. I cannot, here, oﬀ er an exhaustive survey of all 
of the particular diverse forms of liberalism that sprouted from the fertile 
theoretical ground of the Enlightenment. However, a very brief discussion 
of the divergence of the two most historically important branches of clas-
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sical liberalism will, I think, be suﬃ  cient to indicate the basis for my claim 
that only a liberalism that refers, in some way or another, to a sense of epis-
temic anxiety is, ultimately, authentic and sustainable—as well as to indi-
cate, in a preliminary way, the relevance of this view for religious faith.
Beginning with Isaiah Berlin’s seminal essay “Two Concepts of Liber-
ty,”12 political theorists have widely recognized a fundamental distinction 
between the liberalism that very early took root in modern English politi-
cal philosophy through the works of thinkers like Milton, Locke, and (lat-
er) Mill, and the quite diﬀ erent form of liberalism that emerged in France 
and Germany, through the combined infl uence of Rousseau and Kant (cer-
tainly there are also important diﬀ erences within these groupings, but we 
are here focusing on their basic epistemic stances). For our purposes, Kant 
provides a perfect example of an Enlightenment liberal who arrives at a 
respect for human dignity and a principle of moral autonomy through an 
alternative route, one that bypasses the requirement of anxiety for which 
I am arguing. Indeed, Kant, perhaps more than any other philosopher, 
represents the urge to rescue some element of certainty from the jaws of 
epistemic doubt.
For our purposes, Berlin’s discussion of Kant (and Rousseau) is particu-
larly useful because it takes a teleological view, tracing the connections 
between the inner logic of Kantian liberalism and the successive, illiberal, 
developments in Continental political thought that followed. Critics have 
observed that Berlin simplifi es matt ers for himself by ignoring, or at least 
minimizing, certain statements by Kant (and Rousseau) that do not fi t 
neatly into his tidy analytical distinctions and historical narrative. There is 
certainly truth to this criticism. But it also, I think, misses the point. Berlin 
is interested in examining the theoretical and practical consequences that 
follow from various perspectives on human freedom. He adopts a broadly 
evolutionary perspective with regard to Kantian liberalism, rather than of-
fering a more complex and nuanced exegesis, because he is less concerned 
with how Kant himself mediated the various tensions in his formulation 
than with how these tensions played themselves out in the thought (and 
practices) of those who took themselves to be following in his footsteps, 
as a measure of how well suited Kant’s formulation really is to the task of 
grounding support for liberal norms. Since this is also our concern here, 
Berlin’s analysis is apropos. Two points should be born in mind, though. 
First, the issue of whether liberalism can be adequately supported with-
out explicit appeal to the implications of human fallibility does not map 
simply onto Berlin’s famous distinction between ‘negative’ (Locke, Mill) 
and ‘positive’ (Kant, Rousseau) conceptions of liberty—though we may 
suspect that fallibilism fi ts more naturally with negative conceptions. Sec-
ond, in drawing on his critique of Kant’s positive conception of liberty, I 
am not endorsing Berlin’s own particular negative conception as the only 
viable alternative.13
Rather than referencing human fallibility and an att endant sense of 
epistemic anxiety regarding that fallibility, Kant invokes the majesty of hu-
man reason in its capacity as moral lawgiver as the basis for his valida-
tion of individual autonomy. True freedom, according to Kant, consists 
in obedience to the moral law. And, although the moral law is unitary, 
one and the same for all, obedience ideally arises voluntarily, through the 
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autonomous exercise of the individual’s practical judgment, a product of 
the self-legislating function of rationality. The problem, however, is that 
people do not always agree about what rationality reveals to be the proper 
moral judgment in a given situation, nor even what abstract “maxims” (to 
employ Kant’s terminology) ought to govern our conduct in general. But 
this can only mean that not everyone is as rational as everyone else. And, 
given the nature of the relationship between the faculty (and capacity) of 
rationality and right belief and conduct on Kant’s view, this imbalance 
presents a potential challenge to the logic of autonomy. Berlin observes:
[For] Kant and rationalists of his type . . . the limits of liberty are deter-
mined by applying the rules of ‘reason,’ which is more than the mere 
generality of rules as such, and is a faculty that creates or reveals a 
purpose identical in, and for, all men. In the name of reason anything 
that is non-rational may be condemned, so that the various personal 
aims which their individual imaginations and idiosyncrasies lead 
men to pursue . . . may, at least in theory, be ruthlessly suppressed. 
. . . The authority of reason and of the duties it lays upon men is iden-
tifi ed with individual freedom, on the assumption that only rational 
ends can be the ‘true’ objects of a ‘free’ man’s ‘real’ nature.14
Combine such a view of rationality with some claim of absolute authority 
(be it political or spiritual), based upon some process or sign purportedly 
revelatory of the imprimatur of reason (or “truth”), and one has opened 
the door to the most severe abridgments of the very freedom of conscience 
that Kant begins by validating.
This is certainly not to suggest that Kant’s own defense of liberal norms 
was halfh earted or insincere. As Berlin is careful to acknowledge, Kant’s 
intent was to shield the individual from illegitimate encroachments by 
“authority,” whether political or religious, not to provide justifi cation for 
such encroachments (just as Rousseau’s intent was almost certainly to ar-
ticulate a model for deliberative self-governance among mutually autono-
mous individuals, not a totalizing communitarianism that swallows up 
the freedom of the individual in the name of the good of the ‘sovereign’ 
whole). Yet, as Berlin shows, despite their own best intentions, Kant’s con-
ception of rationality and its connection to the law (both moral and civil), 
in historical conjunction with Rousseau’s oft en naïve assumptions about 
the moral and practical reliability of the regulatory expressions of the ‘gen-
eral will,’ led, more or less directly, to the State-deifying conception of the 
relationship between political and moral right found in the Romanticism 
of Fichte and Hegel, the anti-liberal and deterministic stance of Marx’s 
communism, and the totalitarian sensibilities (and, ultimately, practices) 
of their political successors in both Germany and the Soviet Union.
Noting the irony in this progression, Berlin asks, “What can have led to 
so strange a reversal—the transformation of Kant’s severe individualism 
into something close to a pure totalitarian doctrine on the part of thinkers 
some of whom claimed to be his disciples?” The answer, it seems to me, 
lies precisely in Kant’s failure to link his defense of moral and political 
autonomy to a recognition of human fallibility and its implications in rela-
tion to claims of authority. Kant is correct, in my view, to connect support 
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for liberal norms to epistemology, but he neglects to take suﬃ  cient account 
of human epistemic limitations in his formulation of this connection. It’s 
not that respect for the dignity of the human individual qua rational agent 
has no role to play in the logic of liberalism. Respect for the individual’s 
capacity to reason for herself is a necessary, but not a suﬃ  cient, condition 
in the establishment of this logic. It requires a complementary relation to 
the sort of fallibilist delimitation of the claims of authority supported by 
an att itude of rationalized epistemic anxiety.
Kant’s prescription that the individual never be treated merely as 
a “means” but always as an “end” does not necessarily translate into a 
proscription against illiberal coercion if one believes that the individual’s 
salvation (be it political or spiritual) depends upon the acceptance of a 
set of beliefs and practices for the validity of which one claims absolute 
assurance. Under such circumstances, one may—consistently with Kant’s 
principle (even if not his intent)—determine that it is crucial that the in-
dividual adopt the relevant point of view, even if coercion is required to 
guarantee this outcome. Similarly, one may determine that the use of force 
to prevent the dissemination of alternative beliefs and practices is required 
to ensure that the individual (or community) not be led astray from the 
“proper” path.
Though his intent was otherwise, Rousseau expresses the logic of such 
coercion in his famous proclamation that “whoever refuses to obey the 
general will shall be constrained to do so by the entire body, which means 
only that he will be forced to be free.”15 Fichte, then, provides the neces-
sary bridge from republicanism to totalitarianism when he adds: “To com-
pel men to adopt the right form of government, to impose Right on them 
by force, is not only the right, but the sacred duty of every man who has 
both the insight and the power to do so.”16
Thus, there is an historical case for the claim that ‘liberalism’ uncondi-
tioned by the moderating infl uence on ideological absolutism provided 
by a suﬃ  ciently robust recognition of fallibility, in the form of an att itude 
of epistemic anxiety, cannot ultimately sustain itself without sliding over 
into an aggressively dictatorial illiberalism. The potential authoritarian-
ism implicit in the logic of Kant’s and Rousseau’s works gradually re-
vealed itself in the thought of their successors and, tragically, in the form 
of actual totalitarian regimes—with which the nations that had, contrarily, 
adopted the liberalism of Milton, Locke, and Mill were forced to struggle, 
in order to defend (among other things) the value of individual autonomy 
over against the claims of the state. Kant and Rousseau surely would have 
been appalled by what their “disciples” wrought, but that does not change 
the (revealing) fact that it was their disciples—not Milton’s, Locke’s, and 
Mill’s—who drift ed to totalitarianism.
The relevance of this discussion in the context of religious belief should 
be obvious. If we replace the abstract political individual with a hypo-
thetical religious apostate or heretic, and the state with the church, then 
we immediately see the consonance between Fichte’s position and those 
forms of religious orthodoxism that privilege some particular (fallible) 
conception of “the truth” over the right of the individual to exercise moral 
and intellectual autonomy. Fichte’s pronouncement is, of course, regarded 
with horror in light of the historic consequences of the adoption of this 
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att itude as a principle of socio-political regulation in both Nazi Germany 
and the Soviet Union. Similarly, such an att itude in the context of religious 
belief provokes horror in those who see the historical abuses of Christian 
dogma in, for example, the Inquisition, the brutal suppression of “hereti-
cal” views in Calvin’s Geneva, or Christian missionizing in the context 
of western colonialism, as profoundly immoral—and, indeed, unchris-
tian—and who hear echoes of this att itude in the belligerent dogmatism 
of contemporary fundamentalism and ultra-orthodox Catholicism. To be 
sure, contemporary religious conservatives do not advocate such meth-
ods of “discipline” or conversion as were applied in the above historical 
examples. But there is no hard and fast line to be drawn between the att i-
tude of the contemporary orthodoxists and that of their religious anteced-
ents, and it is worth remembering that the current cultural and political 
consensus repudiating such methods developed in spite of the att itudes 
(and eﬀ orts) of past orthodoxists, not because of some internal check that 
they set on themselves out of respect for the dignity of others. Historically, 
the slippery slope into genuine brutality in the name of religious ortho-
doxy has been all too slick and the slide all too common (if not inevitable), 
when religious zeal is unqualifi ed by an acute awareness of the fallibility 
of human understandings.
‘Anxiety’ as an Epistemic Virtue17
Despite the range of responses to the issue of epistemic anxiety oﬀ ered by 
philosophers and theologians during the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries, there was a common tendency to understand such anxiety precisely 
as a problem in need of solution. Niebuhr, for example, blames human anx-
iety about the limitations of fi nitude for the ideological impulse that leads 
to absolutism in religious, moral, and political conviction. His description 
of the psychology of absolutism is worth quoting at some length:
Man knows more than the immediate natural situation in which he 
stands and he constantly seeks to understand his immediate situa-
tion in terms of a total situation. Yet he is unable to defi ne the total 
human situation without colouring his defi nition with fi nite per-
spectives drawn from his immediate situation. The realization of the 
relativity of his knowledge subjects him to the peril of skepticism. 
The abyss of meaninglessness yawns on the brink of all his mighty 
spiritual endeavors. Therefore man is tempted to deny the limited 
character of his knowledge, and the fi niteness of his perspectives. He 
pretends to have achieved a degree of knowledge which is beyond 
the limit of fi nite life. This is the ‘ideological taint’ in which all hu-
man knowledge is involved and which is always something more 
than mere human ignorance. It is always partly an eﬀ ort to hide that 
ignorance by pretension.18
Thus, for Niebuhr, anxiety is not only an inescapable consequence “of the 
paradox of freedom and fi niteness,” but also “the internal precondition of 
sin,” where ‘sin’ is understood as the illegitimate adoption of an absolutist 
stance with regard to one’s own perspective, opinions, values, etc.
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Yet, as Niebuhr goes on to observe: “[A]nxiety is not sin. It must be 
distinguished from sin partly because it is its precondition and not its ac-
tuality, and partly because [anxiety] is the basis of all human creativity as 
well.”19 In other words, it is not the att itude of anxiousness itself but, rath-
er, the all too human tendency to att empt to purge oneself of unwanted 
anxiety, by ignoring both the feeling and its implications and indulging in 
the self-delusion of epistemic privilege, that debases human consciousness 
and freedom through an abandonment of responsibility (or, as Niebuhr’s 
philosophical counterparts would say, ‘authenticity’). Niebuhr is right to 
say that, “Anxiety is the internal description of temptation.”20 But tempta-
tion is only a natural, ineluctable concomitant of moral freedom. To be 
morally free is, by defi nition, to be tempted. Temptation is not, in itself, an 
evil. To the contrary, it is the precondition of all moral achievement—one 
cannot laud the right choices of angels, for they are no choices at all.21
Accordingly, Niebuhr speaks of ‘faith’ not as a means to purge the in-
dividual of anxiety but, rather, as a means to “purge anxiety of the ten-
dency toward sinful self-assertion.”22 Thus, he raises the possibility of an 
unproblematic, even empowering, form of anxiety. Drawing on Kierke-
gaard’s suggestive references to “‘anxiety over nothing’—that pregnant 
anxiety that is directed toward the future and that is a pristine element in 
every human being,”23 Niebuhr describes this positive form of anxiety as 
the psychological ground of human creativity. Niebuhr calls such creative 
anxiety ‘anxiety about perfection,’ which he contrasts to the more insidi-
ous ‘anxiety about insecurity.’24 Anxiety about perfection is occasioned not 
by fear of uncertainty but, instead, by the desire to push one’s understand-
ings and creative accomplishments ever forward, to further the bounds 
of one’s knowledge in the face of the seemingly limitless possibilities pre-
sented by human experience and activity.25
Niebuhr claims, however, that “Anxiety about perfection and about 
insecurity are . . . inexorably bound together in human actions and the 
errors which are made in the search for perfection are never due merely 
to the ignorance of not knowing the limits of conditioned values. They 
always exhibit some tendency of the agent to hide his own limits, which 
he knows only too well.”26 And this is surely true. But the fact that no hu-
man can achieve a perfectly unadulterated embodiment of the virtuous 
form of anxiety does not make such anxiety any less virtuous in character, 
nor should it keep us from encouraging the individual to cultivate the 
virtue of a more perfected, less adulterated anxiety. It is common to virtues 
that they exhibit within themselves the potentiality for vice, when they 
are taken to extremes, or aimed in the wrong direction. Thus, thrift  may 
become greed or acquisitiveness, confi dence may become pride, open-
mindedness may become licentiousness, etc. Moreover, as already dis-
cussed, it is not ‘anxiety about insecurity’ itself that constitutes the error of 
unqualifi ed absolutism but, rather, the reaction against such anxiety in the 
adoption of a dogmatic consciousness.27
Again, all human beings are necessarily fallible. Thus, fallibility is an 
epistemic condition of humanity as such, but, like other epistemic condi-
tions, it can be ignored (at least at a conscious level). Anxiety, on the other 
hand, is both a condition of human existence (a universal one, according 
to Kierkegaard and his successors) and a response to such existence. As a 
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condition, anxiety represents a central element in what was once called 
‘philosophical anthropology’: the elucidation of the fundamental condi-
tions of human nature and existence, both ontic and epistemic. But its 
status as such a condition is derivative from its status as a (universal) re-
sponse to the (defi nitive) condition of fallibility in which each human be-
ing fi nds herself, qua human being.28 And, it seems to me, to the extent that 
anxiety about fallibility causes one to adopt a more generally circumspect 
point of view, it is a virtuous response. For it is only in the acceptance 
of some level of ultimate insecurity—some fundamental preservation of 
anxiety within the context of committ ed belief—that one can overcome the 
temptation to deify one’s understandings. Only thus can one act on one’s 
own convictions always in such a manner as to respect the right of others 
to hold and act according to contrary convictions. Hence, an appropriately 
moderated, but consciously sustained, sense of epistemic anxiety should 
be viewed as a sign of intellectual and psychological maturity. Indeed, 
my claim is that such anxiety represents the central epistemic virtue be-
queathed (unintentionally) to contemporary democratic society and the-
ory by our Enlightenment predecessors and that this epistemic virtue can 
help to support and sustain moral, religious, and political virtues, such as 
humility and tolerance.
An underlying and permanent sense of epistemic anxiety among a 
democratic citizenry is a socially and politically healthy thing, precisely 
because it serves to maintain citizens’ acknowledgement of their own fal-
libility (both as individuals and as members of religious and other groups) 
and, thereby, discourages the sort of illegitimate absolutist and exclusivis-
tic att itudes that tend to undermine the reasonability and productivity of 
democratic discourses. While an overly anxious att itude regarding one’s 
beliefs can lead to an undesirable moral and political paralysis (or an over-
ly reactionary assertion of supposed “certainty” meant to mask the deeper 
sense of insecurity), an appropriately moderated and rationalized att itude 
of anxiety can go far in promoting other democratic virtues, such as intel-
lectual curiosity, cooperativeness and a willingness to compromise, and 
genuine tolerance of others’ beliefs and lifestyles.
Moreover, anxiety, in the sense just outlined, represents a powerful, 
and in some ways less problematic, alternative to the notion of ‘tolerance’ 
as the organizing virtue in discussions of the basis of democratic norms. 
The notion of tolerance has frequently been criticized as seeming to imply 
an att itude of mere grudging agreement to coexist. Simply to ‘tolerate’ 
another in no way obligates one to att empt more fully to understand the 
other’s perspective or beliefs, nor does it compel one to question the sup-
posed certainty of one’s own views. Tolerance, as a mode of engagement 
with others, can signal just as stalemated and stagnant a conversation as 
does intolerance. Reasonable anxiety regarding one’s own positions, on 
the other hand, does obligate one to att empt more fully to understand 
and more fairly to assess alternative positions. And this is so precisely 
because anxiety, unlike tolerance, is an explicitly epistemic, and not 
merely a moral-political virtue. Insofar as a reasonable sense of anxiety 
about one’s own epistemic limitations promotes an acknowledgement of 
the provisionality and revisability of one’s opinions, one is encouraged 
to take democratic discourse seriously, as a cooperative (and relatively 
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non-coercive) mode of inquiry, will-formation, and action. Democratic le-
gal prohibitions against prejudice and forced social or moral conformism 
gain a normative force that is absent when one is merely constrained by 
law to “tolerate” those whom one is, nevertheless, “certain” are wrong.29 
In short, a reasonable level of mutually sustained anxiety among citizens 
regarding their respective beliefs and opinions is the precondition for a 
democratic society of good-faith.
To be clear, my point here is not that anxiety should wholly displace 
tolerance from discussions of liberal norms. Rather, I am proposing that 
epistemic anxiety provides the necessary normative warrant for liberal 
norms such as tolerance. The logic of my argument is straightforward: 
Fallibility is an inescapable condition of human experience and under-
standing. The proper response to this condition is the adoption of a stance 
of epistemic anxiety (as I am here defi ning that term), because an unquali-
fi ed confi dence in one’s own beliefs—in spite of the recognition of falli-
bility—would represent a failure adequately to account for the truth of 
one’s fallibility in the formation of one’s beliefs (and one’s att itude towards 
them). Furthermore, classical liberalism represents the proper sociopolitical 
instantiation of epistemic anxiety, because the norm of non-coercion that it 
propagates is the procedural manifestation of such anxiety in the context 
of interpersonal action. To deny the liberal principle of non-coercion in 
the face of human fallibility is to willfully evade the epistemic anxiety 
that naturally att aches itself to human subjectivity by virtue of its fi nitude 
and fallen-ness. And to express such an evasion is to idolatrously deify 
one’s own understanding and to violate the sacredness of other human 
beings’ moral and intellectual autonomy through an expression of a self-
validating “will to power” masquerading as a righteous concern for the 
salvation of those who are coerced.
The Phenomenology of Epistemic Anxiety
So far, I have characterized the particular notion of anxiety upon which 
my argument is predicated in terms of a conscious acknowledgement of 
the intrinsic fallibility of human understanding (especially one’s own). In 
order further to clarify precisely what I mean by ‘anxiety,’ it will be help-
ful to contrast my use of this term with certain other, somewhat related, 
usages of the same word.
First, as should be obvious at this point, the form of anxiety that I have 
in mind must be distinguished from the common, everyday sense of the 
word, referring to mental stress or tension associated with some nega-
tively anticipated event, challenge, or trial, as well as the related clinical 
sense of the word, referring to some form of persistent, neurotic att itude 
associated with some—real or imaginary—object of dread. Both of these 
types of anxiety can lead to precisely the sort of hardening of sentiment 
and opinion—as a reaction against the feelings of uncertainty they repre-
sent—that I wish to discourage. Just as Kierkegaard and his existentialist 
successors are careful to distinguish anxiety from ‘fear,’30 the former must 
similarly be distinguished from nervousness. To be ‘anxious’ about one’s 
epistemic limitations as a fi nite being is to be self-consciously aware of 
one’s existential situation and motivated to account for it adequately in 
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one’s beliefs, claims, and behavior. To be ‘nervous’ about these limitations 
is to neurotically react to them in a way that, paradoxically, denies their 
inescapability, because such a reaction inevitably leads one either to seek 
succor in the false comfort of an absolutist mentality (that seems to erase, 
but in fact merely represses, the unpleasant insecurity from which one 
takes fl ight) or to embrace despair, indiﬀ erence, and nihilism.
On the other hand, when it is associated with some particular issue 
of policy or social or ethical concern, the common, non-clinical variety 
of emotional anxiety can sometimes motivate people to open up to an 
exchange of ideas aimed at solving some problem or formulating some 
course of action. George Marcus has discussed the political psychology of 
such deliberation-inducing anxiety in The Sentimental Citizen: Emotion in 
Democratic Politics.31 According to Marcus, citizens tend to think and act 
according to habituated patt erns of behavior except when some unantici-
pated or novel stimulus triggers the emotional response of ‘anxiety’ about 
how to think and/or act in light of this new datum or question. Marcus 
claims that only such visceral, stimulus-specifi c anxiety provokes the en-
gagement of the subject’s rational capacities, motivating the ‘anxious’ sub-
ject to employ her deliberative consciousness to come to some resolution 
of the problem or question at hand and, thereby, alleviate her anxiety.32 
“Reason,” he says, “does not come from reason’s own prompting.”33
There are some problems with Marcus’s account of the role of anxiety 
and deliberation in the democratic sphere, however. First, he makes ordi-
nary citizens overly dependent upon political elites, such as members of 
government and the media, who are given almost sole responsibility for 
recognizing emerging problems and issues and employing emotive rheto-
ric in order to inspire the requisite anxiety among the people at-large.34 
This is a problem precisely because, in a democratic society, it is ultimately 
the underlying att itudes and inclinations of the demos itself that are re-
fl ected in the choices that politicians and the media make about what sorts 
of discussions to have and how to portray those discussions to the public. 
If the public doesn’t maintain a constant sense of engagement with emerg-
ing issues, then they will not demand, nor will politicians and media out-
lets provide, the sort of discourse that promotes genuinely democratic and 
deliberative decision-making.
Also, Marcus seems not only to invest too great a trust in political elites 
not to abuse the power of anxiety provoking rhetoric, but also too readily 
to assume that the mobilization of public anxiety will, more oft en than 
not, lead to reasoned discourse, as opposed to reactionism and narrowed 
sentiment and imagination. This problem is directly related to the previ-
ous one: a populace that is accustomed to maintaining a reasonable level of 
deliberation-inducing anxiety at all times will be less likely to fall prey to 
waves of irrational anxiety associated with specifi c socially or politically 
traumatic or revolutionary events or circumstances.35
Finally, Marcus’s account of anxiety remains superfi cial precisely be-
cause he views anxiety only as an emotive state, without signifi cant or co-
herent cognitive content—part of the “unaware and inarticulate” realm of 
emotional response, which he sharply divides from conscious thought.36 
Hence, he is unable to appreciate the cognitive signifi cance of anxiety as 
an intellectual, and not merely an emotional, state or response. Nor is he 
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able to formulate the possibility of a systematic (or methodological) anxi-
ety that permanently maintains the engagement of deliberative openness 
by permanently maintaining a sense of anxiety associated with the ab-
sence of both ultimate certitude and static socio-political equilibrium.
Nevertheless, as a description of the psychological connection between 
the emotional component of anxiety and its intellectual, moral, religious, 
and political implications, Marcus’s account can provide a fi rst step to-
ward a deeper phenomenology of the more thoroughgoing epistemic anx-
iety I am advocating.37 In a sense, one might view such epistemic anxiety 
as a systematic intellectual and practical generalization of the mindset of 
deliberative openness that Marcus describes as the ideal outcome of issue-
specifi c anxiety. The transient emotive state of anxiety that he describes 
can represent the psychological precursor to the adoption of the deeper, 
permanent epistemic anxiety of the self-refl ective democrat, but only in-
sofar as this transient state of uncertainty and deliberative engagement is 
consciously detached from, and generalized beyond, the provoking stim-
ulus in relation to which it arises. The feeling of anxiety must be intellectu-
ally internalized and transformed into an explicit awareness of one’s own, 
and others’, intrinsic fallibility.
Obviously, one who adopts a stance of epistemic anxiety will, at times, 
experience the psychological correlate of emotional anxiety. Yet, such emo-
tionally weighted anxiety must not take on an urgency that contravenes 
the impulse to remain open to dialogue. Nor should it sink into a morbidi-
ty that relinquishes deliberation for despair. Indeed, it is important to note 
the diﬀ erence between ‘anxiety’ and ‘despair,’ where the latt er indicates 
not merely a recognition of human fallibility but also an abandonment of 
the ideals of objective rationality and truth that are presupposed by delib-
eration as such. This is the point at which the present defense of epistemic 
anxiety departs most sharply from the existentialist tradition it references. 
The anxiety that I am advocating here does not presuppose the dissolution 
of the idea of objective reasons (or even values). It recognizes our character 
as self-defi ning beings who make choices about what to believe, choices 
that are limited by our own fi nitude and that are, therefore, fallible. And 
it acknowledges that it can be “anguishing to know that our freedom is so 
far-reaching as to leave our existence permanently unsett led in this way.”38 
But it need not go so far as to pronounce, as the existentialists typically do, 
that there is no source of values that transcends fi nite human understand-
ings and to which such understandings can legitimately make reference.
It is no less ‘authentic’ to believe, wholeheartedly, that one has appre-
hended some objective truth about the human condition or right conduct 
but, in recognition of one’s own fallibility, to avoid any imposition of one’s 
view onto others, than it is to toss aside the notion of moral objectivity 
entirely and simply “own” one’s choices as though they made reference 
to nothing outside of the arbitrary (or perhaps anthropologically im-
posed) conditions of one’s own will. One need not accept Sartre’s claim 
that “nothing, absolutely nothing, justifi es me in adopting this or that par-
ticular value,”39 in order to be true to the insight that one’s choices among 
possible values or actions may be fl awed or incomplete, or may (at least 
in some cases) have equally valid alternatives. Mauvaise foi is expressed 
in claims such as that one could not possibly be mistaken in one’s belief 
398 Faith and Philosophy
about ‘x,’ or that one’s belief about ‘x’ is exempted somehow from the nor-
mal rules of reason and evidence, or that some beliefs are epistemically 
privileged, or that some interpretation of a text is self-evidently ‘inerrant.’ 
There is no bad faith or self-deception in the claim that one holds fi rmly 
to certain beliefs or accepts certain interpretations for reasons that seem 
to transcend the caprice of mere self-defi nition, uninformed by objective 
reference, if one simultaneously acknowledges the possibility that one is 
mistaken about these reasons. So long as one abstains from leveling un-
qualifi ed judgments at those with whom one disagrees, or trying to force 
them to submit to one’s view irrespective of their own wishes and beliefs, 
and remains open to being persuaded otherwise, there is no illegitimate 
fl ight from anxiety.
Kierkegaard sees the embodiment of authentically lived anxiety in the 
person of Socrates,40 who remains in a permanent state of epistemic anxi-
ety precisely because he—unlike Kierkegaard’s ‘knight of faith’—refuses 
to make the subjective leap into ‘the absurd.’ Instead, Socrates relentless-
ly confronts the limits of his own understanding, while simultaneously 
bursting the epistemic bubbles of his various interlocutors. Socrates’ wis-
dom lies in his consistent awareness of his own “ignorance,” and his gen-
eralization of this awareness as an epistemic principle that leads him to 
be suspicious of all unqualifi ed knowledge claims and to compulsively 
pursue deliberative debate with others. Such wisdom, or “Socratic igno-
rance,”41 as Kierkegaard calls it, does not preclude personal commitment. 
Indeed, Socrates is willing to die for his beliefs. But what Socrates would 
presumably not be willing to do is to take the life (or infringe illegitimate-
ly on the freedom) of another in order to promote his own beliefs. Socratic 
anxiety, as I would now like to call it, requires circumspection and humil-
ity, but not indecision or paralysis.
Hume—who consistently recognized the imperatives of belief and ac-
tion, in the face of his own skeptical doubts about human understanding—
beautifully characterizes the att itude and practical implications associated 
with Socratic anxiety in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.42 At one 
point, his skeptical character Philo responds to the charge that skepticism, 
like stoicism, represents a philosophy that can be entertained at an intel-
lectual level but that is impossible to live out in a truly consistent manner. 
Philo replies:
I allow of your comparison between the Stoics and the Skeptics. . . . 
But you may observe, at the same time, that though the mind cannot, 
in Stoicism, support the highest fl ights of philosophy, yet, even when 
it sinks lower, it still retains somewhat of its former disposition; and 
the eﬀ ects of the Stoic’s reasoning will appear in his conduct in com-
mon life, and through the whole tenor of his actions. . . . In like man-
ner, if a man has accustomed himself to skeptical considerations on 
the uncertainty and narrow limits of reason, he will not entirely for-
get them when he turns his refl ection on other subjects; but in all his 
philosophical principles and reasoning, I dare not say, in his com-
mon conduct, he will be found diﬀ erent from those who either never 
formed any opinions in the case or have entertained sentiments more 
favorable to human reason.43
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I have no intention to equate Socratic anxiety with outright ‘skepticism,’ 
and I, for one, certainly do entertain “sentiments more favorable to human 
reason” than those, at times, expostulated by Hume. Yet, as a committ ed 
democrat, I fi nd his description of a mode of reasoning and living that is 
chastened by a recognition of one’s own (and everyone else’s) ultimate fal-
libility very appealing.
I, personally, do believe that human understanding can claim some 
genuinely objective knowledge of the world as it is independently of our 
own mental-linguistic constructions—even if this knowledge can only be 
expressed through the employment of such constructions. I also believe that 
there are certain logically necessary, a priori truths, such as that expressed 
by the ‘law of non-contradiction.’ But there is no obviously correct, no 
‘self-evident,’ set of moral regulations or judgments that can simply be 
deduced from such knowledge with unambiguous certitude. (Nor is there 
any legitimate shortcut around fallibility through the arbitrary epistemic 
privileging of certain ‘scriptures’ or other supposed repositories of infal-
lible wisdom.) While I have strong opinions about many issues, and may 
even feel at times that I cannot understand how any reasonable person 
could disagree with certain propositions, I always know that equally rea-
sonable people do in fact disagree over even the most fundamental moral, 
religious, and political issues (which, of course, is not to say that all posi-
tions in any such dispute are equally reasonable44).
Given the acknowledgement that it is, in principle, always possible that 
I am the one who is mistaken, even regarding my most deeply held beliefs, 
I cannot legitimately claim the right to coerce others to believe as I do. Nor 
can I—in the absence of some voluntary agreement to the contrary—claim 
the right to force them to act in accordance with my principles rather than 
their own. Of course, this position need not imply pacifi sm, and it certain-
ly does not imply anarchism. Indeed, one of my central points is precisely 
that the recognition of human fallibility that is represented by this doc-
trine of anxiety has normative implications at a meta-political level, impli-
cations such as that the use of force or coercive power may be employed 
to prevent others from violating the freedom of their fellow human beings 
out of some misguided sense of epistemic or moral superiority. Anxiety 
about fallibility would have been a good reason for the nineteeth- and 
twentieth-century struggles against slavery and fascism, for example, not 
a reason to have tolerated such practices.
Hume (through Philo) continues, in the same passage quoted above, to 
remark: “To whatever length anyone may push his speculative principles 
of skepticism, he must act, I own, and live, and converse like other men; 
and for this conduct he is not obliged to give any other reason than the 
absolute necessity he lies under of so doing.”45 Since the bearer of Socratic 
anxiety is not necessarily quite so pessimistic about human reason as the 
Humean skeptic, “the absolute necessity” to act, live, and, especially, con-
verse may be understood by the Socratic liberal not as an arbitrary and 
imposed requirement of human existence but, rather, as a valuable epis-
temic compensation. Yes, we are thrust into a world that showers us with 
data while limiting the perspective from which we apprehend it. But we 
are not thrust into this world alone. We have the company of others, who 
likewise perceive the world from limited perspectives, but perspectives 
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not our own. And our diﬀ ering perspectives oﬀ er opportunities for cor-
relation and contrast, for verifi cation and falsifi cation—or at least concur-
rence or challenge.46 Thus, we stand also under the obligation (not “abso-
lute” but normative) to condition our belief with humility—for humility 
is one fundamental moral and religious virtue that follows directly from 
the epistemic virtue of anxiety.
We can and should advocate our respective views. We must argue. And 
we’ve every right to att empt through all legitimate means to persuade. 
But we cannot arrogate to ourselves the right to coerce (at least not outside 
of the legitimate coercive requirements of democratic decision-making 
procedures). For in doing so we deify our own, decidedly non-divine and 
fi nite, understandings. The phenomenology of epistemic, or Socratic, anx-
iety encompasses various levels, from the emotive to the intellectual, and 
it has both methodological and practical implications. In practical terms, 
though, it boils down to a genuine respect for disagreement; a principled 
preference for substantive dialogue as a means of decision-making; an af-
fi rmation of compromise over unilateralism in moral, social, and political 
aﬀ airs; and a strong reluctance to call upon force to reshape circumstance 
before all other viable options have been exhausted.
Anxiety and Tolerance
The idea that genuinely recognizing human fallibility requires allowing 
the free exchange of ideas, respect for others’ opinions, and remaining 
open to the possibility that one is mistaken is hardly revolutionary. It was 
revolutionary when Milton put it forward in his Areopagitica,47 and again 
when Locke reiterated the theme in his Lett er Concerning Toleration.48 And 
it was less revolutionary but importantly expanded and clarifi ed when 
Mill championed it in On Liberty.49 But Milton could not—because of his 
own religious commitments—take his argument to its logical conclusion, 
and he ends up with a signifi cant residue of epistemic privilege in his 
stance towards the truth claims of (Protestant) Christianity, a residue that 
survives in Locke. Mill’s theorization of fallibility (largely) achieves the 
consistency that Milton and Locke failed to realize. But Mill himself sets 
the stage for the methodological transition away from theorized fallibility 
by following Locke in turning immediately to the notion of ‘tolerance’ as 
the moral-political virtue non plus ultra of political liberalism.50
The problem with tolerance, from a non-liberal perspective, is that the-
oretically it is presented as a sort of meta-virtue that ought to transcend all 
various substantive points-of-view, but practically it presents itself as an 
externally imposed mandate that is inconsistent with the prescriptions of 
some substantive points-of-view. In other words, the claim that tolerance 
represents a perspective-neutral principle of rational discourse is chal-
lenged on the grounds that tolerance confl icts with certain religious and 
moral conceptions that stress the need for universal adherence to some set 
of epistemically privileged doctrines. Hence, the issue is oft en treated as 
a confl ict between the civic virtue of tolerance and the religious virtue of 
‘faith.’ But, as the preceding discussion of epistemic anxiety suggests, this 
strictly polemical view of the relation between liberal tolerance and reli-
gious faith rests on fundamental misconceptions of each of these notions.
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In his classic work on the relationship between faith and knowledge in 
religious belief, the contemporary philosopher of religion John Hick ob-
serves that, “According to the most widespread view of the matt er today 
faith is unevidenced or inadequately evidenced belief.” He then goes on 
to add:
Faith thus consists in believing strongly various propositions, of a 
theological nature, which the believer does not and cannot know to 
be true. To know here is taken to mean either to observe directly or 
to be able to prove by strict determination. Where this is possible, 
there is no room for faith. It is only that which lies beyond the scope 
of human knowledge that must be taken, if at all, on faith or trust. 
When in such a case we do adopt some belief, the lack of rational 
compulsion to assent is compensated by an act of will, a voluntary 
leap of trust.51
The problem with this view lies in the qualifi cation expressed in the fi rst 
line of the quote: “of a theological nature.” This implies that ‘faith’ is not 
an element in decisions about what to believe in other arenas. In other 
words, this formulation assumes that in all of the non-theological realms 
of human inquiry and belief it is possible always (or at least very oft en) 
to “observe directly or . . . to prove by strict determination.” Furthermore, 
this view assumes that it is generally the case in non-theological matt ers 
that interpretations of that which is “observe[d] directly” and outcomes 
of “strict” proofs are uncontroversial, because there is a “rational compul-
sion to assent.” But is this the case?
To be sure, it sometimes seems to me that the evidence or arguments 
regarding some issue so strongly support one view of the matt er that I feel 
rationally compelled to assent to that view. Yet, almost invariably there is 
someone else—someone whom I would not be willing to simply dismiss 
as “irrational”—who disagrees. Moreover, even in the most ‘objective’ 
(and I do not mean to belitt le this term) fi elds of inquiry, it is oft en simply 
not possible to directly observe or strictly demonstrate the answer to ques-
tions of real signifi cance. This does not mean that thought shuts down 
in the face of such uncertainty. Inquiry, like life, must proceed in the ab-
sence of fi nal certainty. Thus, science, very much like religion, proceeds in 
agreement where agreement is possible, and it is the backdrop of general 
agreement that allows for the pursuit of those points about which no such 
agreement exists, sometimes leading to discoveries or new theories that 
destabilize or demolish the prior consensus from which they proceeded. 
This is the pragmatic-evolutionary character of scientifi c inquiry, and of 
life in general.
Thus, ‘faith’ is present in all aspects of human understanding.52 To be 
clear, I do not deny that there is a signifi cant diﬀ erence in the degree of 
faith required to aﬃ  rm, say, the basic principles of the theory of natural 
selection, as opposed to the claim that the Nicene Trinitarian formula ex-
presses some fundamental truth about ultimate reality. The latt er certainly 
rests on a thinner evidential foundation. I am simply denying that there 
is a categorical diﬀ erence between the two. That is not to say that there are 
not generally reasons to believe in one way rather than another. But such 
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reasons rarely, if ever, “compel assent”53 for everyone who encounters 
them—and those who believe that they do may be mistaken. The failure 
to recognize that thought and action always depend on some degree of 
faith that one has seen things rightly not only encourages non-religious 
people to unjustifi ably disdain the notion of religious faith per se, but also 
encourages many religious people themselves to accept the notion that 
the objects of belief relevant to their religious lives lie “beyond the scope 
of human knowledge” and are, therefore, exempt from the normal rules 
of evidence. Strict fi deism makes no sense if questions such as “Is this text 
demonstrably the ‘Word of God’?” are in fact open to some measure of 
rational adjudication.
The putative uniqueness of religious belief, as being a matt er of faith, 
provides support for the traditionalist (monotheistic) religious notion that 
faith is a mysterious, divinely-bestowed third element standing between 
the believing subject and the object of belief, encouraging some ‘believers’ 
to view the ‘unbelief’ (notice, not ‘alternative belief’) of others as a product 
(and sign) of the latt er’s moral degeneracy or spiritual defi ciency, rather 
than simply a matt er of intellectual disagreement over an issue on which 
it is possible for reasonable people to disagree. This misconception fur-
ther obscures the too litt le discussed resources for combating absolutism 
that exist within religious traditions, like Christianity, in which the urge 
to absolutism has been historically pronounced.54 Such intolerant believ-
ers embrace what we may call Calvin’s contradiction, aft er the theologian 
who, perhaps, most brazenly weds the notions of religious certainty and 
textual and interpretive ‘inerrancy’ with the directly contradictory notion 
of humanity’s moral and epistemic ‘fallenness.’55 Calvin’s steadfast refusal 
to consider the implications of his view of human ‘depravity’ for his own 
claims regarding the nature and meaning of ‘scripture’ has conditioned 
Protestant belief ever since, sett ing the stage for the fl ight from anxiety 
that has helped to push the self-satisfi ed certainty of many Christians in 
tragically (and sinfully) aggressive and intolerant directions.
Indeed, this all too common propensity to circumscribe the epistemic 
implications of fi nitude within the bounds of an absolutist and exclusiv-
istic religious understanding represents one important reason why the 
traditional virtue of ‘humility’ cannot play the role I am ascribing here to 
anxiety. Humility, like tolerance, is a religious, moral, and political virtue, 
not an epistemic one. Humility certainly can be connected to the epistemic 
conditions of fi nitude, and, yet, one need not genuinely recognize these 
conditions in order to aﬃ  rm humility as a virtue. Many religious absolut-
ists acknowledge the rightness of a humble att itude, but they envision 
such humility as part and parcel of their fi deism. From this perspective, 
one has humility towards God, not towards one’s own beliefs about God. 
Perhaps one also is encouraged to remain humble in one’s relations to 
other humans, but, again, this is encouraged as a requirement of, but not 
with respect to, one’s religious and moral convictions. It was not humility 
but, rather, anxiety that helped provoke the modern west’s move towards 
liberalism. The relationship of anxiety to humility is not one of equiva-
lence, it is one in which the former grounds the latt er more deeply.56
The notion of epistemic anxiety stands as a corrective to the tendency 
among many religious believers to conveniently ignore the implications of 
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human fi nitude for religious belief. Fundamentalism is idolatry. This is a 
language that will strike closer to home for many who are not persuaded 
by the notion of tolerance. The same people who most vociferously hurl 
the charge of “playing God” at those who extend their technological reach 
beyond what the former think appropriate are those most oft en guilty of 
playing God epistemically, of deifying their own fi nite, fallible understand-
ings. And this argument leaves litt le room for strong rebutt al. Even the most 
conservative traditionalist will not be so brazen as to claim infallibility. Of 
course, they will claim it on behalf of some person or group of persons 
portrayed in their religious tradition (e.g., Jesus and the biblical authors), 
but even sett ing aside the a priori argument from fi nitude and granting, 
hypothetically, the possibility that some person(s) might have possessed 
infallibility, the problem remains that only another infallible person could 
inerrantly recognize the infallibility of the fi rst. And no religious tradition 
of which I am aware licenses such a claim by the practitioner.57
At this point, some readers may object that there is an apparent paradox 
or self-contradiction implicit in my account of epistemic anxiety and/or in 
the general liberal principle of non-coercion that I seek to justify through 
this account. Such an objection might take several diﬀ erent forms: First, 
there is a formal conception of the (putative) paradox that is as old as the 
liberalism it is meant to counter. This version of the objection claims that 
the principle of non-coercion is, if enforced, self-violating, because it re-
quires (or may require) the employment of coercive means in order to pre-
vent actions58 that are judged to be contradictory to or inconsistent with the 
principle—e.g., the use of federal law enforcement powers to ensure com-
pliance with civil rights statutes and judicial determinations at state and 
local levels. Traditionally, liberal theorists have responded to this criticism 
by drawing a distinction between ‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’ norms 
and by arguing that liberal political regulation is purely procedural—and, 
therefore, substantively ‘neutral’—in character.59
Thus, the liberal prohibition against coercion is viewed as categorically 
diﬀ erent in character from any substantive belief or principle of action 
that might be enforced contrary to such a prohibition. And this diﬀ erence 
stems, in part, from the fact that liberalism leaves untouched the individ-
ual’s right and capacity to believe and personally to act upon whatever 
beliefs she may acquire (through whatever relevant process of belief for-
mation one might identify), so long as she does not violate others’ right to 
this same freedom. Hence, the validity of the enforcement of liberal norms 
is connected to the ineluctable, pragmatic exigencies of social life.60
Human beings must socialize across ideological lines,61 and the only 
way to do so without enduring endless cycles of violent confl ict or ar-
bitrary oppression of some individuals or groups by others is to adopt 
procedural regulations regarding such socialization that mutually maxi-
mize the respective rights to substantive freedom of all members of soci-
ety. But such mutual maximization of rights requires the minimization of 
the capacity of any particular substantive viewpoint to intrude upon any 
other. While it is true that the latt er form of regulation limits the former (at 
least for those perspectives that validate intrusiveness), it does so of neces-
sity, and, thus, the complaint against it is what Berlin would call a mere 
“counsel of perfection.” Every perspective is limited in the same way, and 
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none more so than any other—and this includes the liberal perspective, 
which is uniquely self-limiting (see below). Furthermore, as Charles Lar-
more rightly observes: “If just laws serve to check the arbitrary will of 
others, their impact on our conduct and the prohibitions they impose do 
not amount in themselves to a reduction in our freedom. By doing away 
with our vulnerability, they bring into existence a realm of freedom that 
we would not otherwise have.”62
Alternatively, one might object that my aﬃ  rmation of the principle of 
human fallibility, upon which my conception of epistemic anxiety—and, 
therefore, my formulation of the basis of the principle of non-coercion and 
other liberal norms—is based, is self-refuting, because such an assertion 
of fallibility itself is subject to doubt on its own grounds. In other words, 
my claim that all human understanding is fallible is also, on its own logic, 
fallible and, therefore, dubitable. But does this really represent a para-
dox or self-contradiction? I do not think so, because ‘fallible’ is not the 
same as ‘false.’ I can perfectly well admit that my own conception of hu-
man fallibility is, itself, fallible, while maintaining my conviction that it 
is, also, true. Indeed, this is the only self-consistent manner in which I can 
maintain this conviction. I am simply admitt ing that it is possible that I’m 
wrong about all of this. That doesn’t mean that I am wrong. Possibility is 
not actuality.
This particular possibility does have normative implications, however, 
which is precisely why, as I noted earlier, I (and other liberals of my type) 
stop short of seeking to coercively disabuse others of their own absolutist 
perspectives. As I just discussed above, the claims of liberalism are inextri-
cably linked to the conditions (and necessities) of social life. The enforce-
ment of liberal norms supported by my conception of human fallibility and 
epistemic anxiety is—consistently with its own logic—self-limiting as well 
as regulatory. That is, the regulatory reach of this conception of the nor-
mativity of liberal norms is limited by its own internal check on the claims 
of authority, including its own authority. Obviously, this is not to say that 
I will not att empt by all appropriate means of persuasion to convince oth-
ers that absolutist understandings are inherently fl awed and pernicious, 
just as I expect that they will att empt to convince me otherwise. I value 
such dialogue precisely because of my recognition of my own fallibility 
(indeed, that is the point). Moreover, my obligatory aﬃ  rmation of the fal-
libility of my own view is the reason why I have deployed various argu-
ments to support my claim regarding the ineluctability of human fallibil-
ity vis-à-vis religious beliefs. If I could somehow infallibly prove human 
fallibility (now, there would be a paradox), then such arguments would be 
superfl uous (and, in the case of the example just given, mistaken).
Finally, one might formulate the objection substantively, rather than for-
mally, by challenging the logic of epistemic anxiety in relation to the very 
dynamics of belief. This form of the objection might proceed thus: Imagine 
that I hold a set of beliefs that, among other things, implies that I have an 
obligation to enforce a particular doctrinal orthodoxy by preventing the 
dissemination of heretical views and, if necessary, to do so coercively. Fur-
ther, assume that this set of beliefs is at least prima facie rational, because it is 
based upon my considered assessment of the relevant evidence. The fore-
going account of the normative implications of epistemic anxiety appears, 
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in this case, to require that, given any doubt whatsoever regarding the cer-
tainty of my beliefs in general, I must reject as false a specifi c belief that 
currently I hold as true upon the basis of the preponderance of evidence as 
I construe it. This seems to be a paradoxical conclusion (and, perhaps, an 
impossible requirement in practice, given the oft en involuntary character 
of belief formation as a function of evidential consideration).
But this objection misconstrues the relationship of epistemic anxiety to 
the dynamic of belief that informs our hypothetical orthodoxist’s convic-
tion. My point is that human fallibility itself is an ineluctable element in the 
body of evidence that our erstwhile believer must consider in forming her 
beliefs in the fi rst place. In other words, epistemic anxiety does not require 
that she paradoxically fi nd false a belief that she heretofore held to be true 
on reasonable grounds; rather, it calls into question the assumed reasonable-
ness of her belief that she is justifi ed in approaching others coercively because 
such a belief necessarily ignores the epistemic implications of the fact of 
human fallibility (and it is worth emphasizing that my claim is limited to 
her belief in her right of coercion; she may, on my view, continue reason-
ably to have faith in her overall belief system, despite her recognition of 
its fallibility, since there can be no rational obligation to eschew substan-
tive belief in general—because “ought implies can”). Thus, the normative 
connection between fallibility and anxiety, and, in turn, between anxiety 
and liberalism, is founded on the very rational obligation to consider all 
relevant and available evidence in the formation of one’s beliefs to which 
this objection refers.
Now, one might att empt to avoid this implication for religious belief by 
admitt ing that fallibility is, indeed, an ineluctable condition of human na-
ture and, therefore, a signifi cant evidential factor that must be considered 
in the formation of rational belief but, also, claiming that revelation—when 
added into the mix of evidential support for a certain set of beliefs—can 
override the normative implication of fallibility by providing a touch-
stone of certainty that trumps all reasonable doubt. But, as I have already 
shown, this position involves a vicious regress, because any claim to an 
infallible, revelatory understanding could only be inerrantly identifi ed as 
such by one who was, already, also infallible (and therefore without need 
of such a revelation, in any case).
The same logic obviously holds, mutatis mutandis, for any revelatory 
text, act, etc. Indeed, with things like texts and acts, the problem is com-
pounded by issues of interpretation.63 Hence, appeals to revelatory knowl-
edge can validate the claims of faith only when that faith is conditioned by 
an acceptance of the fallibility of the very “knowledge” provided by (and 
deciphered from) the revelation(s) in question—that is, only when that 
faith embraces the virtue of epistemic anxiety.
Nor will it do to admit that human fallibility must be considered as one 
element in the evidential mix but claim that a consideration of the whole 
of the evidence might still, legitimately, lead one to aﬃ  rm an orthodoxist 
position (if that implies a willingness to coerce others to think as one does 
or to force them to act in accordance with an ideology they do not share). 
The implications of acknowledging one’s own fallibility must be viewed 
categorically, not as a matt er of degree, in relation to one’s interactions with 
others. For there is a categorical diﬀ erence, morally speaking, between 
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voluntarily adopting and adhering to a perspective or ideology on the 
basis of one’s own fallible construal of the evidence for and against it and 
forcing someone else to adopt and/or adhere to it contrarily to her own 
judgment on the matt er. It is one thing, to take a currently prominent ex-
ample, for an individual to suppress and refrain from acting upon her 
own homosexual tendencies on the basis of her commitment to a religious 
perspective that proscribes them. It is quite another thing for her and oth-
er members of her religious community to seek coercively to impose the 
same proscription on others.
This is the point at which epistemic anxiety connects with respect for 
the dignity of the individual. As I indicated in my discussion of Kant, lib-
eralism certainly depends upon such respect, but it also depends—cru-
cially, I think—on the recognition that respecting human dignity requires 
respecting the right of others to construct, and live in accordance with, 
diverse conceptions of what contributes to and what derogates from that 
dignity. And, I submit, it is epistemic anxiety, as I have formulated it here, 
that produces and supports this further recognition. If one could know 
infallibly that one’s own perspective on any matt er of moral judgment were 
correct, then such knowledge would (at least arguably) override the moral 
distinction between adopting the requirements of this perspective for one-
self and imposing them on others. Without such a guarantee, however, 
one must respect the right of others to adopt contrary perspectives as a 
matt er of highest principle.
Therefore, tolerance is not an “externally imposed mandate” that stifl es 
the spirit of religious belief by holding in check its naturally evangelical 
impulse. Rather, it is an internal requirement of the logic of the religious 
mentality, which is founded upon the recognition of humanity’s inade-
quacy in the face of forces and questions that are larger than us, holding 
in check what Niebuhr calls “the tendency toward sinful self-assertion.” 
Thus, true religious faith does not imply a ‘teleological suspension of the 
ethical,’64 nor, for that matt er, the liberal. For such faith—insofar as it makes 
even implicit reference to the distinction between the infi nitude of its ob-
ject and the fi nitude of its subject—necessarily includes recognition of the 
inadequacy of the individual’s understandings and, therefore, prohibits 
dogmatically motivated action that transgresses contractual ethical norms 
and freedoms. In other words, genuinely self-refl ective faith in something 
that is believed to transcend the human, eo ipso, implies the normativity of 
liberal norms, like tolerance.
Tolerance is not the foundational virtue of liberalism. Tolerance is de-
rivative from anxiety, psychologically, historically, and theoretically.65 
Anxiety about the limitations of one’s own understanding—an inescap-
able byproduct of the erosion of appeals to epistemic privilege that helps 
defi ne the Enlightenment mentality—is the true sine qua non of liberal 
democratic culture. In a society in which epistemic anxiety is suppressed, 
neither tolerance nor liberty can long survive.
Conclusion
Finally, I would like to say a last word regarding the common connota-
tions of the term ‘anxiety.’ While I have tried to show that there are good 
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reasons for accepting a use of the term that is positive, rather than negative, 
it should also be clear that the mindset that I am propounding is a diﬃ  cult 
one. The conscious acceptance of anxiety, in the sense I have outlined here, 
represents the embrace of a higher level of self-responsibility. This is not 
an easy task, nor should we expect it to be. If virtuous att itudes and behav-
iors came easily, we would all live in near utopias. This is one thing that 
religious consciousness understands and that liberals have been too reluc-
tant to insist upon. Genuine liberal democracy, like genuine spirituality, 
makes serious, sometimes even unpleasant, demands on its practitioners. 
We must give something up, in order to gain something immeasurably 
greater—in this case, the ignorant bliss of a self-satisfi ed understanding, 
for a society in which people are free to choose for themselves not only 
how to interpret the world but also how to live in it.
Sartre, at one point, observes that the existentialists’ diagnosis of the 
human condition is rejected “not [because of] our pessimism, but the 
sternness of our optimism.”66 We live in a world in which only a stern 
optimism is a credible optimism. Anxiety regarding our inescapable 
fallibility-in-fi nitude represents more than a past turning point in human 
history; it represents the maturation of human consciousness, and maturi-
ty, like civilization, has its discomforts. But without an ever-present sense 
of such anxiety, we fall back into a self-satisfaction (or worse, a nervous 
bellicosity) that belies the fundamental truth revealed in all of the world’s 
great traditions of wisdom: we are imperfect.67
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